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New Mexico State University 
Las Cruces, New Mexico 
 
Due to the difficulty of performing multiple tasks, operators in complex environments are often 
aided by automation. Because automation is not always perfect operators must decide how much 
to trust in and depend on the automation aids. Theoretically operators can adjust their level of trust 
using either a component-specific or a system-wide trust strategy. This study tests these two 
theories. 36 participants monitored two gauges, each with an automated aid at different reliability 
levels, while engaged in a pursuit tracking task that simulated an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) 
mission flight. The data suggest that participants do not evaluate the reliability of each gauge 
independently (i.e. component-specific trust), but instead combine their experience from each 
automation aid and derive one overall perceived reliability value for the entire system consistent 
with the system-wide trust hypothesis. 
 
 Operators when engaged in complex environments are frequently responsible for multiple tasks (Dixon & 
Wickens, 2006). Often the number or complexity of the tasks can not be completed safely or efficiently by the 
operator alone (Sheridan, 1987). Therefore, automation has become prevalent to aid the operators in completing 
these tasks. 
 
Automation can be classified into four different stages that perform synthesis, diagnosis, response selection 
and response execution functions (Parasuraman, Sheridan & Wickens, 2000). This study focuses on diagnostic 
automation. One goal of diagnostic automation is to alert operators of relevant information (e.g. Wogalter & 
Laughery, 2006) to ensure that the important information is quickly processed (Wickens & McCarley, 2008). The 
addition of a diagnostic aid allows operators to perform difficult multiple tasks without the need to constantly switch 
attention between automated and non-automated tasks.  
 
 Unfortunately, in many cases automation is not perfectly reliable. Therefore it is up to the operator to 
decide how much to trust in and depend on the automation aids. Thus, it is important to understand how trust works, 
and what factors moderate how operators determine how much they will use an automated aid. Much is known in 
regards to trust in diagnostic automation for single automated aids (e.g. Dixon & Wickens, 2006; Dixon, Wickens, 
& McCarley, 2007; Lee & Moray, 1994; Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000; Rice, in press; Rice, Clayton & 
McCarley, in press; Rice & McCarley, 2008; Rice, Clayton, Wells & Keller, 2008; Rice, Hughes, McCarley & 
Keller, 2008; Rice, Trafimow, Clayton & Hunt, in press). However, less is known about trust in multiple automated 
aids. The current study focuses on these issues. 
 
Some researchers have used the term focus of trust when discussing trust in multiple agents. The focus of 
trust can be described by the level of detail that the trust is centered on, which varies from trust in a specific agent to 
general trust (Couch & Jones, 1997). Because so much research has been done using only one automated aid, 
researchers and system designers may believe that operators are able develop trust in individual aids which we call 
component-specific trust. If this were the case then operators would have the ability to evaluate the reliability of an 
individual aid independently of the performance of the other aids. Therefore we would hypothesize that an operator 
using component-specific trust, using two aids of different reliability levels, will use each aid differently in 
accordance to how reliable the aids really are. 
 
However, given the complexity of using multiple automation aids it is also possible that operators may 
actually rely on a more general focus of trust at the system-wide level. At the system-wide level of trust, operators 
would determine the reliability of each aid based on the performance of the entire system.  Operators using system-
wide trust would combine experiences from each automation aid and derive one overall perceived reliability value 
for the entire system. If this were the case, operators would respond to each individual alert according to the overall 
perceived system reliability. We would hypothesize then, that when using two aids each with different reliability 
levels, the operator will use both aids the same as if they both had the same reliability level.  
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The current study tested these two hypotheses against each other by having participants monitor two 
gauges, each with its own diagnostic aid. The reliability of each aid varied from perfectly reliable (100%) to 
moderately reliable (85%) to fairly unreliable (70%). Participants were also responsible for a concurrent pursuit 






36 participants (17 females) from New Mexico State University participated in the experiment. The mean 
age was 20.1 (SD = 2.89) with a range from 18-29.  
 
Apparatus and Stimuli  
 
The experimental simulation ran on a Dell Vostro 200 computer, with a 21” Dell monitor using 1600 x 
1200 resolution. The experimental display (see Figure 1) consisted of two areas to allow for both the tracking and 
monitoring tasks. The tracking task was performed using the top portion of the display. The tracking task consisted 
of participants controlling a crosshair image to “track” a computer controlled aircraft image on the display. 
Participants controlled the crosshair image using an Attack3 Logitech joystick. The program was designed so that 
participants had to exert constant feedback on the joystick. If participants did not, the crosshair image would drift 
toward the outer edges of the display. The computer controlled aircraft moved around on the screen in a random 
pattern. The simulation program determined the random movements of the aircraft image by randomly selecting a 
new movement direction (up, down, right, left, up-right, up-left, down-right, down-left) roughly every second. The 




Figure 1. Screenshot of experimental display. 
 
 
The monitoring task consisted of participants monitoring two gauges for system failures. The two gauges 
were located at the bottom center of the display. Each gauge consisted of 10 black numbers equally spaced around 
the inside of a circle. The numbers were displayed sequentially (clockwise) around the circle, starting with the 
number 0 at the top center of the circle and ending with the number 9.  
 
The values of the gauges were represented using two needles (one black and one red). The black needle 
represented units of 1000. The red needle denoted units of 100. Thus, the values of the two gauges depicted in 
Figure 1 are approximately 3,690 for the gauge on the left and 1,290 for the gauge on the right. The movement of 
the black needle was driven by the sum of four sine waves ranging in bandwidth from 0.04 to 0.43 Hz. The 
movement of the red needle was dictated by the movements of the black needle. As the black needle oscillated back 
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and forth in its random patterns, the red needle followed in a linear fashion just as the minute hand moves in 
accordance to the hour hand on an analog clock.   
 
Above each gauge were two boxes, outlined in black, with numerical values. The number in the left box 
indicated the ideal value for a safe system. The number in the right box indicated the range of safety for the system. 
Thus, for the example shown in Figure 1 the gauge on the right indicated a safe system as long as the needles stayed 
within 3800 ± 400 (3400-4200). The gauge indicated a system failure (SF) if the needles went out of this range. If 
the participant believed that a SF had occurred, the participant was expected to press the appropriate button on the 
joystick as quickly as possible. When a SF occurred, the needles stayed out of the acceptable safe value range until 
the trial ended. 
 
All participants were aided on the monitoring task by an automated aid for each gauge the participants had 
to monitor. The automated aids sounded an auditory alert (i.e., a synthesized human voice pronouncing the word 
“alert one” for left gauge and “alert two” for the right gauge) when they detected a SF. The automated aids were 
100%, 85%, or 70% reliable. The automation aids, expressed in the framework of signal detection theory, provided 
hits, false alarms (FA), or correct rejections (CR). Each aid, regardless of reliability, made 20 hits during the 100 
trial experiment. The perfectly reliable aid made 80 CRs, and 0 FAs. The 85% reliable aid made 65 CRs, and 15 




There were 100 experimental trials that each lasted 30 s. At the beginning of each trial, the target safe value 
changed to a new random value between 1,000 and 9,000, rounded to the nearest 100. The target safe range also 
changed to a new random value between 100 and 900, rounded to the nearest 100. Also at the beginning of each 
trial, the SF gauge itself reset to the target safe value and then immediately began oscillating. SF and non-SF trials 
were randomly ordered. SFs and automation FAs always occurred within a temporal window beginning 5 s and 
ending 12 s from the start of the 30 s trial interval, thus giving the participant at least 18 s to detect the failure and 
respond. Only one gauge at a time indicated a system failure and there was never more than one SF or automation 
alert per trial. Trials lasted the entire 30 s, regardless of whether or not a SF occurred or was detected. During each 
trial, participants were allowed to make only one SF response and were not allowed to change a response. Once a 30 
s trial ended, participants were no longer able to respond to that particular trial. At the end of each trial, participants 




The experiment used a 2 x 3 factorial mixed design with Automation Reliability as the within-participant 
variable and Condition as the between-participant variable. This design resulted in three experimental conditions: (a) 
100/100 – consists of both automation aids being 100% reliable; (b) 85/100 - consists of one imperfect aid at 85% 
reliable and one perfect aid; (c) 70/100 – consists of one imperfect aid at 70% reliable and one perfect aid. The 




Participants were first asked to read and fill out a consent form. Participants then received extensive verbal 
instructions, followed by a 20-trial practice session. Participants were told that both tasks (tracking and monitoring) 
were of equal importance. After the practice trials, participants then were told about the automation aids. Each 
participant was told that the automation might or might not be perfectly reliable and that the imperfect automation 
would err by producing false alarms (no misses). Participants were also told that the aids worked independently of 
each other and that the reliability of each aid might differ from each other. They were not told exactly how reliable 




The following dependent measures were analyzed: SF sensitivity (d’), response time (RT), and tracking 
error (TE). Overall ANOVAs were performed on the data, followed by post hoc comparisons when necessary. The 
independent variables included Reliability and Condition. Reliability consisted of each participant viewing one 
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perfectly reliable aid and one imperfect aid (except in the condition where both aids were perfect) at the same time. 
The Condition variable consisted of the imperfect aid (from the automation reliability variable) having a reliability 




SF sensitivity was assessed using the signal detection measure d’. Perfect scores (e.g., zero operator misses 
or FAs) were adjusted by assuming ½ a miss or FA. These data are presented in Figure 2. A two-way ANOVA using 
Condition (70/100, 85/100, and 100/100) and Reliability (whether or not the automation was perfect or imperfect) 
revealed a main effect of Condition, F(2, 33) = 12.41, p < .0001, η2 = .43, no main effect of Reliability F(1, 33) = 
0.22, p = 0.644, η2 = .01, and no interaction between Condition and Reliability, F(2, 33) = 0.56, p = 0.579 η2 = .03. 
These results are consistent with the idea that participant trust in the perfectly reliable gauge was reduced as a 
function of it being linked with an imperfectly reliable gauge (i.e. system-wide trust).  
 
Post Hoc comparisons revealed that participants’ sensitivity was significantly lower when using perfect 
aids in the 85/100 condition, t(22) = 2.85, p = .009, η2 = .27, and the 70/100 condition), t(22) = 3.79, p = .001, η2 = 
.40, when compared to the corresponding aid in the 100/100 condition (see Figure 2). When linked with an 
imperfectly reliable aid, the perfectly reliable aid suffered compared to an identical perfectly reliable aid that was 
linked with another perfectly reliable aid. This effect was both statistically and practically significant regardless of 










RT was measured from the time that a system failure occurred to the time the participant responded by 
pressing the appropriate button on the joystick. A two-way ANOVA using Condition (70/100, 85/100, and 100/100) 
and Reliability (whether or not the automation was perfect or imperfect) revealed a significant main effect of 
Condition, F(2, 33) = 4.15, p = .025, η2 = .20. There was also a significant main effect of Reliability, F(1, 33) = 4.41, 
p = .043,  η2 = .12, which was not entirely unexpected since one would expect that the perfectly reliable aid would 
facilitate quicker RTs than would the imperfectly reliable aid. However, because this finding did not address any of 
our theoretical points, we did not pursue further analyses on this effect. Lastly, there was no interaction between 
Condition and Reliability, F(2, 33) = .04, p = .963, η2 = .002, (see Figure 2) a finding consistent with the data from 
d’, which indicated that when linked with an imperfectly reliable aid, the perfectly reliable aid suffered compared to 
an identical perfectly reliable aid that was linked with another perfectly reliable aid.  
 
In addition, post hoc comparisons revealed that participants’ RT was significantly slower when responding 
to SFs with perfect aids in the 85/100 condition, t(22) = 1.85, p = .038,  η2 = .14, and the 70/100 condition, t(22) = 
3.35, p = .003,  η2 = .34, when compared to the corresponding aid in the 100/100 condition (see Figure 2). Again, 
performance suffered for perfectly reliable aids when paired with an imperfect aid compared to performance when 
both aids are perfect. This effect applies when the imperfect aid was 85% reliable or 70% reliable. 

































Overall Tracking  
 
Tracking error was calculated using the Root Mean Square (RMS) error, which was defined as the distance 
between the positions of the controlled UAV image and the chase plane image. A one-way ANOVA with condition 
as a between-participants factor revealed no effects of condition, F(2, 33) = .48, p = .6204, η2 = .003. These data 
alleviate any concerns about a tracking/monitoring performance tradeoff. Only the monitoring task was affected by 
the experimental manipulations, while the tracking task remained stable, presumably because operators were 






The current study tested two competing theories of trust when using multiple aids. The component-specific 
theory suggested that operators would determine the reliability of each automated aid separately and therefore use 
them differently. System-wide trust predicted the opposite, which is that operators would determine the reliability of 
each aid according to the performance of the overall system and not according to the performance of each individual 
aid. Therefore operators using system-wide trust would treat each aid the same as if they both had the same 
reliability.  
 
The results show that system-wide trust best predicts how operators, in the context of this study, use 
systems with multiple automation aids. Overall operator performance on the monitoring task (d’ and RT) declined, 
when using an aid that was 100% reliable along side an imperfect aid (see Figure 2). In addition, performance was 
no different for both aids, when operators were using one aid that was perfect at the same time as another aid that 
was imperfect. This effect was evident for both d’ and RT, indicating that there was no speed-accuracy tradeoff. 
Likewise, as the tracking error did not differ significantly between conditions, we can conclude that there was no 
tradeoff between the tracking task and the monitoring task, indicating that operators possibly protected the tracking 
task at the expense of the monitoring task.  
 
Theoretical Limitations. The theoretical limitations of this study are fairly straightforward and suggest 
future research. First, it is premature to generalize these findings to other paradigms because the nature of the 
current task is highly specialized. Second, the current study only employed FAs, and not automation misses. Third, 
because both SF gauges were identical and close together, it could be the case that the physical characteristic of the 
gauges generated a stronger trust merging behavior than one would expect from dissimilar SF gauges.  
 
Practical Implications  
 
From a practical perspective designers and operators of systems with multiple aids should be aware of how 
operators may spread their trust across the different automated components, especially when each aid differs in 
reliability. One would hope that operators can and do treat each aid differently according to the true reliability of 
each aid. However, as this study demonstrated, it is possible for the performance of one automated aid to 
significantly affect how an operator will treat other aids in the system. One obvious problem of system-wide trust is 
that if operators determine their use of an aid based on the overall system performance, instead of on the reliability 
of the individual aid, operators may lose trust and therefore disuse highly reliable automation aids, as was shown in 
this experiment.  The disuse of the reliable aid could entail unnecessary monitoring and/or inappropriate overruling 
of the perfectly good automated aid (Muir & Moray, 1996). The disuse of automation will not only hinder 
performance on the task aided by the highly reliable aid but will take valuable attentional resources of the operator 




This study demonstrated operators may very well use system-wide trust when using a system with multiple 
automated aids. The results showed that performance (RT and d’) suffered when using a perfectly reliable aid when 
the operator was also exposed to an imperfect aid. Due to system-wide trust the imperfect aid penalized trust in the 
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perfectly reliable aid. Operators and system designers should be aware of the possibility of system-wide trust in their 
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